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Abstract
We investigate whether race and ethnicity inuenced subprime loan pricing during
2005, the peak of the subprime mortgage expansion. We combine loan-level data on the
performance of non-prime securitized mortgages with individual- and neighborhood-
level data on racial and ethnic characteristics for metropolitan areas in California
and Florida. Using a model of rate determination that accounts for predicted loan
performance, we evaluate the presence of disparate impact and disparate treatment
discrimination in mortgage rates. We nd evidence of redlining and adverse pricing
for blacks and Hispanics. The evidence of adverse pricing is strongest for purchase
mortgages and mortgages originated by non-depository institutions.
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1 Introduction
Financial and technological innovation in underwriting processes has altered the manner
through which discrimination may manifest in mortgage markets. Research on the role
of income and race on consumer lending using mortgages originated prior to 1995, when
mortgages were usually underwritten manually, found strong evidence that lenders were
denying credit more frequently to black households than to white households with similar
observable characteristics.1 After 1995, risk-based pricing of credit, rather than mere credit
allocation, may have become an alternative channel for discrimination, particularly in the
subprime market where lenders were much less likely to sell the loan to government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) and were thus less constrained by rm cutos on variables such as loan-
to-value (LTV) ratios, loan size, and credit scores. In a world where lenders cope with credit
risk by rationing credit, discrimination manifests itself primarily in loan denials. In contrast,
when borrowers choose among several dierent sets of loan terms, each with a dierent
price, minorities may be able to obtain credit but may have to pay a higher price for it.
Perhaps in response to more stringent allocation constraints in prime mortgage markets,
a disproportionate share of subprime loans were made to black and Hispanic households
(Mayer and Pence, 2008).
In this paper, we use data on non-prime mortgages originated in 2005 in California and
Florida to examine the inuence of race and ethnicity on loan pricing across eight popular
subprime mortgage products. We evaluate the presence of discrimination in loan pricing by
analyzing the eect of race and neighborhood characteristics separately on: (1) the assess-
ment by lenders of borrowers' risk proles in an actuarial stage and (2) the interest rate
determination in an underwriting stage. This approach allows us to detect both disparate
treatment and disparate impact discrimination. The former is manifest when lenders apply
1The seminal study is by Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell (1996). Ross and Yinger (2002)
provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of the literature surrounding that study; see also Duca and
Rosenthal (1993), Ladd (1998), Bostic and Redfearn (2004), Elul (2004), and Yavas (2004). For a model of
redlining in a credit-rationing framework, see Lang and Nakamura (1993).
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dierent pricing rules based on individual racial or neighborhood characteristics. The latter
occurs when policies that do not explicitly take racial or neighborhood characteristics into
account result in disparities among racial groups because race is correlated with other vari-
ables that may be used in underwriting, even when they are not necessarily good predictors
of loan performance.
We also use our approach to detect income- and race-based redlining|that is, whether
lenders charge higher rates to borrowers living in low-income neighborhoods or in neigh-
borhoods with high concentrations of minorities. Additionally, we analyze whether blacks
and Hispanics face more subtle forms of discrimination. For example, as suggested by Ross
and Tootell (2004), lenders may require black and Hispanic borrowers to purchase private
mortgage insurance (PMI) when they would not require a white borrower with a similar risk
prole to do so.2
We nd adverse pricing eects in all of the products we examine. In particular, for the
most popular mortgage product, 30-year adjustable rate mortgages,we nd that black and
Hispanic borrowers face interest rates 12 and 29 basis points higher, respectively, than other
borrowers. We also nd evidence of income- or race-based redlining in seven of the eight
mortgage products we analyze, including the most popular mortgage product.
We nd that mortgage market channels and borrower awareness of the mortgage market
inuence the adverse pricing. Therefore, adverse pricing may not necessarily reect explicit
discrimination on the part of lenders. For example, we nd stronger evidence of adverse
pricing in purchase mortgages, which include rst-time home buyers with limited experience
in the mortgage market, than in renancings. The evidence of adverse pricing we nd is also
strongest among loans originated by non-depository institutions. We nd much less evidence
of adverse pricing in loans originated by depository institutions.
A portion, but certainly not all, of the adverse pricing we nd can be explained by
dierences in default and prepayment behavior by minorities and households in low-income
2A limitation of our study is that we do not know the size of the prepayment penalty (PPP), and it
remains possible that there are dierences in PPPs across race that we do not account for.
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neighborhoods or households with a high proportion of minorities. That is, we nd some
evidence of statistical discrimination. Finally, the adverse pricing we nd appears to be due
to disparate treatment rather than disparate impact.
Our study is most closely related to that of Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009) who
examine 2/28 mortgages originated in August 2005 for the entire United States, but nd
no evidence of adverse loan pricing from race and ethnicity. Our paper diers from that of
Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009) in four important ways.
First, our methodology allows us to detect both disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment and to identify statistical adverse pricing. In contrast, the methodology of Haughwout,
Mayer, and Tracy (2009) is aimed only at detecting disparate treatment discrimination, with-
out exploring the source of potential disparities across racial groups. Second, in our approach
we also emphasize detecting income- and race-based redlining. Third, we analyze whether
blacks and Hispanics face more subtle forms of discrimination regarding prepayment penalty
(PPP) or PMI requirements. Finally, we examine eight dierent mortgage products whereas
Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy conne their analysis to one category. Our product deni-
tions emphasize the amortization term of the mortgage. Although the mortgage categories
in both studies are not directly comparable, we do not nd evidence of racial discrimination
in ARMs with interest-only payments for the rst two years, consistent with the ndings of
Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy. However, we do nd evidence of income-based redlining in
this category.
Additional recent papers that examine the eect of race on credit include those by Wood-
ward (2008), Woodward and Hall (2010), Reid and Laderman (2009), Pope and Sydnor
(2011a), Ravina (2008), and Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2011). Woodward (2008) and
Woodward and Hall (2010) examine closing costs and nd that they are higher for minorities.
Reid and Laderman (2009) study the link between race and ethnicity and the likelihood of
obtaining higher-priced loans in California. Rather than focusing on price dierences within
a product category, Reid and Laderman analyze whether minorities had dierential access
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to mortgage markets and nd that this channel, rather than disparate treatment of minori-
ties, led to higher foreclosure rates among minority households. Pope and Sydnor (2011a)
and Ravina (2008) analyze the peer-to-peer lending market and nd evidence of higher loan
pricing for black borrowers compared with white borrowers with similar risk proles. Rather
than focusing on discrimination per se, Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2011) look at the eect
of both the borrower and the lender being of the same ethnicity on credit outcomes. While
they nd that shared ethnicity increases the supply of credit, which may indicate inecient
allocation of credit, they also nd that shared ethnicity increases the likelihood that a loan
is repaid which suggests some possible benets from the inuence of ethnicity on credit
markets.
A much larger literature examines the eect of race and ethnicity on outcomes in other
markets. Recent contributions attempting to detect statistical discrimination in particular
include Altonji and Pierret (2001), Pope and Sydnor (2011b), and Chandra and Staiger
(2010). Altonji and Pierret (2001) develop a method test for the presence of statistical
discrimination in the labor market. Pope and Sydnor (2011b) present an approach similar
in spirit in ours but better suited to the labor market than the mortgage market. Chandra
and Staiger (2010) examine racial disparities in health care and nd that, to the extent they
exist, they are not due to prejudice on the part of health care providers.3
In the next section, we describe the data and summarize the matching algorithm. In Sec-
tion 3, we present the model of rate determination and describe the estimation methodology.
We present our results in Section 4 and provide concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Data
Our data are non-prime, private-label securitized, rst-lien mortgages originated in 2005 in
California and Florida. We merge detailed data on the performance and terms of the loans
3See Ross (1996, 1997, 2000) and Ross and Yinger (2002) for a discussion of why the analog to Chandra
and Staiger's approach in the mortgage market - the so-called default approach that Berkovec, Canner,
Gabriel, and Hannan (1994) among others try to use - is inconclusive in the context of mortgages.
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from CoreLogic Information Solutions, Inc. (CL) with data on borrower income, borrower
race, Census tract income, and Census tract racial composition obtained under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). To match loans from CL with HMDA data, we use a
matching algorithm similar to that of Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009) that uses lender
names, dates of origination, and geographic location.
2.1 Matching CL data with HMDA data
The matching procedure considers rst-lien loans with the same purpose (purchase or re-
nance) and occupancy status (owner-occupied). CL associates each loan with a 5-digit ZIP
code, whereas HMDA loans are associated with Census tracts. To match ZIP codes with
Census tracts we used Census ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs).4 We also used the
geographic information systems (GIS) software program Arcview to establish Census tract
search areas associated with any given ZCTA as follows: For each loan in CL, we determined
the smallest set of Census tracts that intersect with the associated ZCTA and we allowed for
the union of the Census tracts in the intersection to extend over the geographic area dened
by any given ZCTA.
Except for the use of ZCTAs, we followed Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy's (2009) match-
ing algorithm very closely. The procedure entails six stages that use the originator's name,
the loan amount, and the origination dates to obtain the matches. The names are provided
by the lenders themselves in the HMDA data, but not in the CL data. As a result, lender
names in CL must be cleaned manually before the matching. Loan amounts are provided
in dollars in CL, while they are provided in thousands of dollars in HMDA. Furthermore,
HMDA allows lenders to round up loan amounts to the nearest thousand dollars if the frac-
tion equals or exceeds $500. The dates are matched to within 5 business days if the CL dates
are not imputed or to the same month if they are.5 A summary of the various stages is as
4ZCTAs are statistical entities developed by the Census to tabulate summary statistics from the 2000
Census for geographic areas that approximate the land area covered by each ZIP code.
5CL origination dates are considered to be imputed if they are exactly two months before the rst payment
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follows:
 Stage 1 considers loans with matched originator names and uses the larger 4-digit
ZCTA search areas. Loan amounts are matched allowing a dierence of up to and
including $1,000.
 Stage 2 ignores originator names and uses 4-digit ZCTA search areas, as in stage 1.
 Stage 3 again considers originator names, but uses the smaller 5-digit ZCTA search
areas. Loan amounts are matched allowing a dierence of up to but not including
$1,000.
 Stage 4 is similar to stage 3 but ignores originator names.
 Stage 5 is similar to stage 1 but loan amounts are matched to within 2.5% of the CL
amount.
 Stage 6 is similar to stage 2 but loan amounts are matched to within 2.5% of the CL
amount.
At the conclusion of each stage, only one-to-one matches are kept and are removed from
the datasets, while loans with multiple matches (either one CL loan to many HMDA loans,
or many CL loans to one HMDA loan) are returned to the matching pool for the subsequent
stages. We also applied various data checks to the nal sample of loans, including dropping
observations with missing or erroneous FICO scores, as well as dropping observations with
contract rates smaller than the reported HMDA spread of the loan's annual percentage rate
with a Treasury security of comparable maturity. For additional details on the matching




Tables 1 through 4 contain summary statistics on the loans in our sample by race and
product type. Table 1 summarizes the counts of mortgages by product and race that were
matched. We consider three racial or ethnic categories: Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks,
and the remainder (Other: non-Hispanic and non-blacks).6 We also consider the largest
seven non-prime mortgage categories (which account for about 90 percent of all non-prime
loans) and we include a category for the remainder. We dene the categories according to
the frequency distribution of the CL variable prod type with an amortization period of 30
years.
We estimate our model separately for the dierent product types because the eect of
loan characteristics on performance may dier according to the amortization structure. For
example, a high LTV at origination is likely to be a much bigger contribution to default for
loans that are interest-only for 10 years than for loans that start amortizing immediately.
The categories are 2-year ARMs (with interest-only payments for the rst two years with
full amortization over the remaining term), 3-year ARMs (with interest-only payments for
the rst three years with full amortization over the remaining term), 10-year ARMs (with
interest-only payments for the rst 10 years with full amortization over the remaining term),
10-year xed-rate mortgages (FRMs) (with interest-only payments for the rst 10 years with
full amortization over the remaining term), 5-year ARMs (with interest-only payments for
the rst ve years with full amortization over the remaining term), 30-year ARMs, and
30-year FRMs. We include all other loans in the remainder (Other) category.
We matched 281,180 purchase loans and 373,630 renances, for a total of 654,810 mort-
gages. Hispanic borrowers obtained 101,576 purchase loans, almost 5 times the amount for
black borrowers, and they obtained 96,441 renancing loans, about 3 times the amount for
black borrowers. The most popular products for home purchases across all race categories
6HMDA distinguishes Hispanic borrowers with an ethnicity indicator and provides a separate variable
to distinguish among races. Our denition of Hispanics therefore includes borrowers of any race, while our


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































were 2-year ARMs, 30-year ARMs, and 5-year ARMs. For renances the most popular prod-
ucts also included 30-year FRMs. For comparison, Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009)
matched only 2/28 ARMs using national data for August 2005 for a total of about 75,000
loans. Although Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy do not specify how they dened 2/28 mort-
gages, in addition to prod type, the CL variable first rate, which contains the number of
months before the rst rate reset, is often used to dene hybrid loans that exhibit an initial
period of xed interest rates; for 2/28s, first rate￿ 24. According to this denition, the
hybrid 2/28 may include loans from all the ARM categories we analyzed.
Table 2 summarizes the proportion of loans by product and racial groups that (1) included
PPPs, (2) required purchase of PMI, and (3) required full documentation of income (Full
Doc). Unconditionally, black and Hispanic borrowers face PPPs more frequently than other
borrowers in all product categories. Also, both black and Hispanic borrowers tend to be
required to obtain PMI more often than other borrowers for most mortgage products. Finally,
black borrowers are also required to provide full documentation of income slightly more often
than Hispanics and other borrowers.
As Table 3 indicates, black and Hispanic borrowers tend to have lower FICO scores
across most mortgage products (except that for 2-year ARMs Hispanic borrowers show a
slightly higher FICO score than other borrowers). Black and Hispanic borrowers also tend
to have mortgages with LTV ratios and higher debt-to-income (DTI) ratios. The variable
Good Credit summarizes these dierences; Good Credit takes a value of 1 if the borrower has
a FICO score above the 50th percentile, the LTV ratio is at or below the 50th percentile,
and the DTI ratio is at or below the 50th percentile. In summary, a smaller proportion of
black and Hispanic borrowers exhibit good credit compared with other borrowers both for
purchases and for renances.
We thus do not see evidence of steering in our data, in the sense of a higher number
of high quality black and Hispanic borrowers than white borrowers in the subprime sector.
The results in Table 3 in fact suggest the opposite. In every product category except 2yr
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Table 2: Prepayment Penalties, Private Mortgage Insurance, and Full Documentation
Product Race N PPP PMI FullDoc
2-yr ARM Hispanic 14,176 0.95 0.10 0.40
Black 2,590 0.94 0.11 0.53
Other 17,118 0.92 0.11 0.48
Total 33,884 0.94 0.11 0.45
3-yr ARM Hispanic 3,902 0.74 0.10 0.46
Black 931 0.78 0.08 0.61
Other 7,828 0.61 0.07 0.50
Total 12,661 0.66 0.08 0.50
30-yr FRM Hispanic 20,718 0.81 0.19 0.54
Black 7,507 0.88 0.22 0.66
Other 53,919 0.72 0.18 0.61
Total 82,144 0.76 0.19 0.59
30-yr ARM Hispanic 80,422 0.92 0.19 0.36
Black 26,587 0.94 0.22 0.50
Other 172,872 0.87 0.18 0.41
Total 279,881 0.89 0.18 0.40
10-yr FRM Hispanic 2,661 0.33 0.05 0.29
Black 554 0.26 0.04 0.40
Other 10,822 0.27 0.03 0.39
Total 14,037 0.28 0.04 0.37
10-yr ARM Hispanic 9,270 0.48 0.05 0.16
Black 1,628 0.43 0.07 0.26
Other 28,243 0.35 0.05 0.26
Total 39,141 0.38 0.05 0.24
5-yr ARM Hispanic 42,592 0.90 0.17 0.42
Black 8,826 0.89 0.16 0.56
Other 70,358 0.81 0.15 0.52
Total 121,776 0.85 0.16 0.49
Other Hispanic 24,276 0.91 0.10 0.30
Black 5,708 0.92 0.12 0.45
Other 41,302 0.83 0.11 0.39
Total 71,286 0.87 0.11 0.37
Prepay, PMI, and FullDoc indicate the shares of mortgages with prepayment penalties,
private mortgage insurance, and full documentation, respectively.
All loans have terms of 30 years. A 2-yr ARM is an ARM that is interest only for the rst
two years and fully amortizing over the remaining 28 years. Three-year ARMs, 5-yr ARMs,
and 10-yr ARMs are dened in the same way but with interest-only periods of three, ve,
or ten years. Thirty-year ARMs are fully amortizing over the thirty years as are 30-yr
FRMs. Finally, the 10-yr FRM is an FRM with interest-only payments for the rst ten
years and full amortization over the remaining 20 years.
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ARMs, where there is a slightly larger share of high quality Hispanic borrowers than Other
borrowers, there is a larger share of high quality Other borrowers in the nonprime sector
than blacks and Hispanics. While it is certainly possible that many borrowers in all product
categories could have qualied for a mortgage in the prime sector, the evidence does not
suggest that high quality borrowers were directed into the nonprime market by virtue of
being a member of a minority group.
Table 4 summarizes the loan amounts and contract interest rates. It also provides the
average spread as provided to HMDA for loans that HMDA denes as high cost loans. Loan
amounts for blacks and Hispanics are smaller than for other borrowers, and loan amounts
for blacks are almost always smaller than for Hispanics. Black and Hispanic borrowers
generally face higher contract interest rates than other borrowers. Finally, the dierence in
the rates paid by black and Hispanic borrowers relative to other borrowers is somewhat less
pronounced in the spreads.
We focus on contract rates rather than the annual percentage rates (APRs). HMDA
reports only the spread of the APR over a Treasury security of comparable maturity for
high-cost loans (i.e., loans for which the spread is 300 basis points or more). Slightly half of
the loans in our sample meet this threshold such that the variable is truncated. Furthermore,
recovering points from the APR would require several assumptions. First, since a constant
maturity 30 year Treasury series is not available during 2005, we would have to assume the
calculation was performed using the 20 year Treasury. Originators compute the APR for each
loan by assuming that the loan is held to maturity and that the loan adjusts to the initial
fully indexed rate at origination (which is not necessarily equal to the contract rate). The
originator is only required to report the APR rounded to the nearest one-eighth of 1 percent.
Given this APR computation method, it is not possible to accurately identify from the APR
the amount of points paid by the borrower. To understand the diculty with recovering
points from the APR, consider the following example: A 30 year ARM has an initial contract
rate of 6.5% and the fully indexed rate at origination is 7.2%. If the originator reports the
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Table 3: Borrowers' Credit Characteristics
Good Credit FICO LTV (%) DTI (%)
Product Race N Share Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2-yr ARM Hispanic 14,176 0.14 660.18 46.71 81.18 7.31 32.79 18.27
Black 2,590 0.10 643.68 44.79 81.62 8.87 32.19 18.45
Other 17,118 0.12 651.55 48.11 81.12 8.34 32.01 18.70
Total 33,884 0.13 654.56 47.56 81.18 7.97 32.35 18.51
3-yr ARM Hispanic 3,902 0.26 664.84 56.00 80.05 9.13 18.63 20.55
Black 931 0.20 649.86 57.44 80.07 9.94 18.30 20.42
Other 7,828 0.30 668.83 61.02 79.05 9.69 16.82 20.16
Total 12,661 0.28 666.21 59.46 79.43 9.55 17.49 20.32
30-yr FRM Hispanic 20,718 0.24 649.75 64.63 69.64 15.96 22.99 21.13
Black 7,507 0.15 625.73 65.11 71.77 15.82 24.50 20.96
Other 53,919 0.31 657.27 70.42 70.18 16.23 20.59 20.72
Total 82,144 0.27 652.49 69.12 70.19 16.14 21.55 20.90
30-yr ARM Hispanic 80,422 0.18 633.14 68.85 77.35 11.87 27.65 20.08
Black 26,587 0.10 608.35 65.16 78.48 12.07 28.56 20.07
Other 172,872 0.26 641.08 76.99 75.61 12.71 24.52 20.27
Total 279,881 0.22 635.69 74.28 76.38 12.45 25.80 20.26
10-yr FRM Hispanic 2,661 0.59 709.43 48.10 72.44 13.36 14.36 19.13
Black 554 0.62 708.08 48.62 71.95 13.59 13.33 18.89
Other 10,822 0.66 720.15 48.88 69.94 14.66 13.54 18.63
Total 14,037 0.65 717.64 48.94 70.50 14.41 13.69 18.73
10-yr ARM Hispanic 9,270 0.46 711.40 43.87 77.57 8.47 25.07 18.81
Black 1,628 0.42 704.44 46.41 77.40 9.11 26.22 18.55
Other 28,243 0.50 718.48 44.92 75.78 10.78 25.41 18.00
Total 39,141 0.49 716.22 44.90 76.27 10.24 25.36 18.22
5-yr ARM Hispanic 42,592 0.17 667.16 49.71 80.25 7.77 33.67 18.12
Black 8,826 0.13 651.31 48.76 80.71 8.73 33.63 18.43
Other 70,358 0.19 666.37 53.11 79.55 9.15 32.07 18.93
Total 121,776 0.18 665.56 51.79 79.88 8.67 32.74 18.63
Other Hispanic 24,276 0.19 651.17 60.32 76.32 12.11 30.89 19.38
Black 5,708 0.15 630.64 61.77 75.96 13.16 30.96 19.30
Other 41,302 0.29 662.13 70.53 73.96 14.12 27.76 19.31
Total 71,286 0.25 655.88 67.14 74.92 13.44 29.08 19.39
The variable Good Credit takes a value of 1 if the borrower has a FICO score above the 50th percentile, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at or below the 50th
percentile, and debt-to-income (DTI) ratio at or below the 50th percentile.
All loans have terms of 30 years. A 2-yr ARM is an ARM that is interest only for the rst two years and fully amortizing over the remaining 28 years.
Three-year ARMs, 5-yr ARMs, and 10-yr ARMs are dened in the same way but with interest-only periods of three, ve, or ten years. Thirty-year
ARMs are fully amortizing over the thirty years as are 30-yr FRMs. Finally, the 10-yr FRM is an FRM with interest-only payments for the rst ten
years and full amortization over the remaining 20 years.
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Table 4: Loan Amount and Contract Interest Rate
Loan Amount ($) Contract Rate (%) HMDA Spread (%)
Product Race N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2-yr ARM Hispanic 14,176 316,103 119,105 6.73 0.72 4.45 0.66
Black 2,590 306,834 128,936 6.78 0.79 4.46 0.74
Other 17,118 339,721 139,265 6.74 0.77 4.42 0.72
Total 33,884 327,326 131,016 6.74 0.75 4.44 0.69
3-yr ARM Hispanic 3,902 303,265 122,460 6.45 0.83 4.43 0.74
Black 931 288,766 145,428 6.53 0.86 4.50 0.75
Other 7,828 352,607 178,613 6.32 0.90 4.39 0.80
Total 12,661 332,706 162,949 6.37 0.88 4.42 0.78
30-yr FRM Hispanic 20,718 235,716 125,729 6.68 0.84 4.28 0.90
Black 7,507 196,835 126,474 7.06 1.04 4.31 0.97
Other 53,919 264,165 184,481 6.68 0.93 4.22 0.93
Total 82,144 250,837 168,013 6.71 0.93 4.25 0.93
30-yr ARM Hispanic 80,422 274,441 153,603 6.60 1.91 4.77 0.90
Black 26,587 236,264 149,899 7.15 1.72 5.02 0.98
Other 172,872 342,874 249,107 6.27 2.22 4.87 0.98
Total 279,881 313,083 220,862 6.45 2.11 4.85 0.96
10-yr FRM Hispanic 2,661 325,813 169,578 6.32 0.54 4.54 0.83
Black 554 326,014 177,325 6.35 0.55 4.46 0.91
Other 10,822 390,752 245,285 6.20 0.47 4.32 0.86
Total 14,037 375,887 231,983 6.23 0.49 4.41 0.86
10-yr ARM Hispanic 9,270 355,922 169,045 6.14 0.65 4.52 0.80
Black 1,628 356,047 200,023 6.15 0.72 4.53 0.83
Other 28,243 438,059 266,626 5.96 0.69 4.43 0.83
Total 39,141 415,195 247,145 6.01 0.68 4.48 0.82
5-yr ARM Hispanic 42,592 320,851 131,012 6.63 0.76 4.53 0.77
Black 8,826 312,547 147,233 6.70 0.82 4.57 0.81
Other 70,358 355,918 178,554 6.51 0.81 4.42 0.79
Total 121,776 340,509 162,244 6.57 0.79 4.48 0.78
Other Hispanic 24,276 313,273 146,037 6.81 1.30 4.74 0.89
Black 5,708 292,839 160,319 6.99 1.39 4.90 0.97
Other 41,302 368,615 227,265 6.46 1.69 4.78 0.97
Total 71,286 343,701 200,317 6.62 1.55 4.78 0.94
HMDA spread denotes the spread between the APR and the yield on a Treasury security of comparable maturity if the loan is a high-cost loan, dened
as one for which the spread is 300 basis points or more.
All loans have terms of 30 years. A 2-yr ARM is an ARM that is interest only for the rst two years and fully amortizing over the remaining 28 years.
Three-year ARMs, 5-yr ARMs, and 10-yr ARMs are dened in the same way but with interest-only periods of three, ve, or ten years. Thirty-year
ARMs are fully amortizing over the thirty years as are 30-yr FRMs. Finally, the 10-yr FRM is an FRM with interest-only payments for the rst ten
years and full amortization over the remaining 20 years.
133 A MODEL OF MORTGAGE RATE DETERMINATION
APR as 7:125%, it is possible that the borrower paid no points (unrounded APR of 7:133%),
paid 1 point (unrounded APR of 7:233%), or received 1 point (unrounded APR of 7:034%)
although this last possibility is unlikely given originators' incentives. If the originator reports
the APR as 7:25%, we can infer only that the borrower paid one point (unrounded APR of
7:233%) or two points (unrounded APR of 7:439%). Thus, any measure of discount points
derived from the APR is necessarily quite imprecise.
It seems entirely possible that some racial discrimination or redlining may exist in the
points paid by borrowers.7 Since most loans in our sample are prepaid long before maturity,
the APR is a much noisier measure of the cost of borrowing than the initial contract rate.
For example, the APR for a 30-year ARM with an interest rate that rst resets ve years
after origination largely reects the hypothetical reset rate (the rate the borrower is assumed
to pay for the remaining 25 years on the loan) but a relatively small proportion of borrowers
will still have the loan ve years after origination. Furthermore, in preliminary analyses, we
found much less variation across borrowers in the APR than in the contract rate on almost
any dimension. Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009) also nd that lenders seem to price
risk primarily in the initial contract rate rather than subsequent reset rates.
Originators in our data appear to specialize in dierent product types. The top origi-
nators dier substantially across products. For instance, no originator appears in the set of
top 10 originators in every product.8 Additional summary statistics of the variables used in
the analysis are presented in Tables 12 to 14 of Appendix B.
3 A Model of Mortgage Rate Determination
In this section, we present a simple reduced-form model of mortgage rate determination
derived from a test proposed by Ross and Yinger (2002, ch. 10). In the model, lenders charge
a rate based on the expected performance of the loan. Loan performance is judged by the
7See Woodward (2008) and Woodward and Hall (2010) on this issue.
8Condentiality restrictions in our data agreement prevent us from presenting summary statistics regard-
ing the number of originations by originator.
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expected probability that it produces adverse outcomes|for example, default or prepayment.
Along the lines of Ladd (1998), who discusses various denitions of mortgage discrimination
in light of the relevant mortgage laws, we allow for the possibility that lenders may vary the
rate charged based on variables used to identify two broad classes of discrimination: disparate
treatment and disparate impact. The former is manifest in rate changes directly associated
with race variables. The latter occurs when policies that do not explicitly take race into
account result in disparities among racial groups because race is correlated with other non-
racial variables that may be used in underwriting, even when they are not necessarily good
predictors of loan performance. To this end, we allow loan performance to vary with racial
and neighborhood characteristics. Furthermore, by including Census tract characteristics,
namely, the tract's median family income relative to the median income of the metropolitan
area and the percent of minority population, we can also detect redlining.9
The advantage of this approach is that it enables us to detect both disparate impact and
disparate treatment discrimination, both of which are illegal. Disparate impact discrimina-
tion is illegal because lenders can easily mimic the eect of disparate treatment discrimination
using disparate impact discrimination. That is, the lender can change the weight of vari-
ous loan characteristics to discriminate against certain racial groups by taking advantage of
correlations between race and non-racial borrower or loan characteristics that inuence loan
performance.
For example, suppose that a lender would like to charge black people more for their loans
than white people. Suppose that the average FICO score of a black person is 100 points
lower than the average FICO score of a white person and that a 100-point increase in the
FICO score lowers the probability of default by 10 percent. If the actuarially-fair reduction
in the interest rate is 50 basis points for each 10 percent decrease in the default probability,
we should observe that black people have interest rates on average 50 basis points higher
9The median income of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or metropolitan division (MD), as appli-
cable, is reported in HMDA. HUD determines whether lenders should use the MSA or the MD income and
provides the relevant income to lenders. We refer to the MSA or MD as the metropolitan area.
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than white people. After controlling for the eect of the FICO score on loan performance,
we should not nd a signicant eect of black race on rates. However, if the lender wishes
to discriminate against black people, the lender can increase the interest rate by, say, 200
basis points for each 100-point decrease in the FICO score.
We identify adverse pricing as follows:
1. We randomly split the sample of loans for a particular mortgage product in two halves
and estimate loan performance models on the rst half (using default and prepayment
as the adverse outcomes) using loan, individual, and Census tract characteristics in-
cluding the minority status of the borrower, the income of the Census tract, and the
racial composition of the Census tract. We label this the actuarial stage.
2. We then use the estimation outcomes from stage 1 to compute the predicted perfor-
mance of the loans in the second half of the sample using loan and individual char-
acteristics. The measure of predicted performance omits the minority status of the
borrower, the Census tract income, and the racial composition of the Census tract.
3. Finally, we estimate a model with the loans from stage 2 using the actual interest rate
as the dependent variable and the predicted probabilities of default and prepayment.
We label this the underwriting stage.
3.1 Empirical Framework
To formalize, consider the following linear rate-setting equation:
Rn ￿ 0 ￿ pp Pn ￿ zzn ￿  d xxn ￿ en; (1)
where Rn is the rate charged for loan n, p Pn is a p ￿ 1q vector of measures of predicted
loan performance, zn is a pz ￿ 1q vector of non-racial variables, and en ￿ N p0;2q. The
px ￿ 1q vector of treatment variables xn includes a set of individual indicators (i.e., borrower
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race) and a set of neighborhood indicators (e.g., neighborhood racial composition). The
symbol d denotes the Hadamard product and the model indicator  is a vector of 0s and 1s
with dimensions px ￿ 1q. Individual elements of  will determine the presence of disparate
treatment or redlining in the rate: If k ￿ 1, then xk is turned on, indicating the appropriate
form of discrimination.
To estimate equation p1q, we require the vector of predicted loan performance measures,
p Pn. Loan performance data typically consist of binary measures (e.g., the loan defaults
or is prepaid within two years) which would not be available at the time the rate is set.
Instead, we construct a vector of expected loan performance, which is composed of the
forecasted probability of loan default and the forecasted probability of prepayment. To
construct these, we extract from the full sample of loans a subset of loans to use as an
actuarial sample. From this sample, we estimate models of loan performance and use the
resulting estimation to construct predicted performance for loans in a dierent underwriting
sample on which we evaluate the presence of discrimination.
We partition the full set of loans into an M loan actuarial sample and an N loan under-
writing sample. Let Pm represent the vector of  dierent performance measures for loan
m from the actuarial sample. Let qm represent the pq ￿ 1q vector of non-racial character-
istics that aect loan performance (e.g., FICO score, LTV ratio), and let wm represent the
pw ￿ 1q vector of racial and neighborhood characteristics (black and Hispanic indicators,
tract income, etc.) that may aect loan performance. For any loan m in the actuarial sam-
ple, the probability that the event outlined by performance measure i occurs (e.g., that loan
m defaults), Pim ￿ 1, can be specied as a probit:
PrrPim ￿ 1s ￿ pi0 ￿ iqqm ￿ iwwmq; (2)
where the link function, p:q, is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf)
and i ￿ ri0;iq;iws are slope coecients specic to the ith performance measure. From
p2q, the predicted probabilities for loans from the underwriting subsample are computed as
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p Pin ￿ pp i0 ￿ p iqqnq; (3)
where, again, p:q is the standard normal cdf, and p 0 and p q represent the estimated pa-
rameters of equation p2q. Note that the vector of race and neighborhood variables, wm, is
excluded from the calculation of the actuarially consistent predicted loan performance mea-
sures. The use of these variables as predictors of loan performance is illegal; therefore, we
must extract their eect from the loan performance model to properly assess the eect of
other measures.
3.2 Estimation
The model could, in principle, be estimated with either classical or Bayesian methods; we
utilize the latter for a number of reasons. First, in the Bayesian framework, directly incor-
porating the uncertainty in the predictions from the probit into the estimation of the rate
equation is straightforward. Predicted performance in the rate equation p1q is a generated
regressor (see Pagan, 1984) because it is computed from a model with unknown coecients.
In a classical environment, uncertainty for the two-step procedure can be incorporated by
estimating the probit model using, for example, maximum likelihood. A bootstrap might
then be employed to generate the standard errors which could be incorporated in the esti-
mation of p1q. In the Bayesian framework, the posterior distribution of the rate coecients
are computed considering the uncertainty in p2q directly. This is especially important given
the nonlinearities in the predicted probabilities obtained from the probit.
Second, standard (classical) tests for discrimination might examine the statistical signif-
icance of the coecients on the xns in alternative versions of equation (1), one which uses
predicted performance as in equation (3). We instead opt for a Bayesian environment in
which we can assess directly the probability that discrimination is present in the sample
through the indicator, k. Thus, estimated uncertainty about the binary indicator can be
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directly interpreted as the probability of discrimination. We favor this interpretation as it
has a legal avor, where the k can be interpreted as a verdict and the xk can be interpreted
as a degree of damage. Also, zeroing out any excluded indicator allows unbiased estimation
of the magnitude of the included slopes.
Finally, the Bayesian framework allows for the imposition of prior information. While we
impose relatively at priors on the slope coecients in both the actuarial and underwriting
stages, we could impose relatively informative priors on the indicators.10 This is important
because of our treatment of discrimination as a combination variable: a binary variable
reecting the presence of discrimination and a continuous variable reecting the extent of
the discrimination. In particular, if one wanted to hold a higher (or lower) standard for
discrimination, one could choose a lower (or higher) prior probability of discrimination.
The posteriors used for inference are generated from the Gibbs sampler using two Metropolis-
in-Gibbs steps. The Gibbs sampler is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo technique that iteratively
draws each parameter from its conditional distribution. The collection of draws converges
to the full set of parameters' joint posterior. Inference is performed on a subset of draws,
some of which are discarded to allow for convergence.
Our algorithm is a three-step procedure. In the rst step, we draw the slope parameters
of the probit. Second, after allowing for convergence, for each draw of , we compute our
predicted performance measure, p Pn, conditional on the draw of . In the third step, for each
p Pn, we then iteratively draw 1,500 samples of  and , burning the rst 1,000 to account
for convergence. The rst step is repeated 500 times after convergence is achieved. We store
every tenth draw of  and , which yields 500 draws of  and 25,000 draws of  and , which
are then pooled. Note that the sampling algorithm described here accounts for the sampling
uncertainty in  that would create the generated regressor problem in p Pn. The nal result
is a set of posterior distributions for  and  and a set of model inclusion probabilities for
10The slope coecients in both the rate equation and in the probit have mean zero normal priors; the
variance of the innovations in the rate equation has an inverse gamma prior. The prior on the model indicator
for the results outlined in the following sections are uniform.
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each of the xns. Details of the sampling methods, including the specications for the priors
and the posterior draws, are included in Appendix A.
4 Results
4.1 Loan Performance
As discussed in the previous section, we randomly divide the sample for each mortgage
product in half. We use the rst half to form the actuarial sample and estimate the probit
model for two measures of loan performance: default within 2 years and prepayment within
2 years of closing.11
Tables 5 and 6 present the results from the loan performance models using the actuarial
sample. Table 5 shows the results for the default measure, and Table 6 shows the results
for the prepayment measure.12 The coecients in the tables represent the medians of the
posterior distributions of the parameters. We shade out cases in which 0 is contained in
the 90 percent coverage interval, indicating that a variable is not a statistically important
determinant of the corresponding performance measure. The results from the loan perfor-
mance models indicate that standard measures of credit worthiness, such as FICO scores,
LTV ratios, and, to a lesser extent, DTI ratios are important determinants of both default
and prepayment. The coecients on the renance dummy variable indicate that renances
are associated with lower default and higher prepayment. Borrowers with 30-year FRMs and
30-year ARMs are more likely to default in Florida than in California, while most mortgage
products are less likely to be prepaid in Florida than in California. Black and Hispanic
11We consider a loan in default if the CL variable MBA STAT takes a value of 9 (90-days or more
delinquent), F (in foreclosure), or R (REO). We consider a loan prepaid if the loan leaves the database
or has an MBA STAT of 0 in a particular month and the MBA STAT variable does not take a value of
6 (60-days delinquent), 9, F, or R in the month before the loan leaves the database. To keep our model
parsimonious, we do not construct loan performance measures for other horizons; see Demyanyk (2009) for
evidence on the large proportion of subprime loans that terminate within two or three years of origination.
12Models of mortgage performance often include a prepayment option variable (i.e., the spread between
the rate on the loan at origination and the current market rate). We include dummies for the month of














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































borrowers are more likely to default in ve of the eight mortgage product categories. PPPs
for black and Hispanics appear to be associated with lower default rates for some products;
they have a negative impact on prepayment in some mortgage products. Higher tract income
(measured as Census tract median family income relative to the metropolitan area) and a
higher tract share of minority population are associated with both lower default probability
and higher prepayment probability across most product categories.13
4.2 Loan Pricing
Table 7 presents the estimation of the rate-setting equation, equation (1). The estimated
coecients are separated in four panels corresponding to the constant; the measures of pre-
dicted performance, ^ P; the non-racial variables, z; and the race and neighborhood variables,
x. As in Tables 5 and 6, the coecients represent the medians of the posterior distribution
and the shaded out coecients in the ^ P and z panels indicate that 0 is contained in the 90
percent coverage interval.
The coecients associated with the treatment variables in the x panel also represent the
medians of the posterior distributions, conditional on the corresponding inclusion variable
, for cases in which the model inclusion probability (that the value of  in equation (1) is
equal to 1) exceeds 90 percent, which indicates the presence of adverse pricing.
We do not report estimated coecients of the race and neighborhood variables, x, if the
estimation procedure does not indicate that the corresponding x variable should be turned
on at least 90 percent of the time. We do, however, report the model inclusion probabilities
for adverse pricing, Prp ￿ 1q, in Table 8. In this table, the bold entries correspond to the
coecients reported in Table 7.
The results from Table 7 indicate that both measures of forecasted performance (default
within 2 years and prepayment within 2 years) have a positive impact on rate determination.
13In the benchmark specication, we do not include borrower income directly in our performance estimation
since (back-end) DTI is highly correlated with a function of the mortgage amount and income. We have
estimated the model with borrower income and the results are quite similar to the benchmark case, however;
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The increase in the rate from a 1-percentage-point increase in the probability of default
ranges from 4 to 12 basis points depending on the product. The increase in the rate from a
1-percentage-point increase in the probability of prepayment ranges from 1 to 5 basis points
depending on the product.
PPPs are associated with higher rates in four of the mortgage product categories but
have a negative association with rates in 2-year ARMs. Similarly, the PMI requirement has
a positive association with rates in ve of the eight mortgage products. Higher loan amounts
reduce interest rates in most categories, and loans in Florida exhibit higher interest rates
than in California in all mortgage categories.
Table 7 indicates that the black and Hispanic indicators have a positive eect on interest
rates for 30-year ARMs. Black borrowers face rates about 29 basis points higher for this
product while Hispanic borrowers face rates about 12 basis points than non-Black, non-
Hispanic borrowers. Furthermore, Hispanic borrowers face rates 6 basis points higher in the
10-year ARM category, 15 basis points higher in the 5-year ARM category, and 14 basis
points higher in the \Other" category. Table 8 illustrates that for the \Other" category,
a direct impact from the black indicator is a borderline case in which the model inclusion
probability does not meet the threshold we set to indicate discrimination; the inclusion
probability is 82%.
The purchase of PMI among black and Hispanic borrowers lowers interest rates in 30-
year ARMs while the purchase of PMI lowers the interest rate for Hispanics in the \Other"
category.
A higher tract income is associated with lower interest rates in 2-year ARMs, 30-year
FRMs, 30-year ARMs, 10-year FRMs, 5-year ARMs, and the \Other" category indicating
income-based redlining. Income in the regression is measured relative to the median income
in the metropolitan area such that the interpretation of the results in Table 7 is that a
household that lives in a Census tract with double the median income of the income in the
metropolitan area enjoys a 2-year ARM mortgage rate that is 11 basis points lower than a
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borrower who lives in a Census tract with median income equal to that of the metropolitan
area.
A higher share of minorities in a Census tract leads to higher interest rates for 3-year
ARMs, 30-year ARMs, and 10-year FRMs. The increase in the rate from moving from a
Census tract with no minorities to a Census tract with only minorities ranges from 9 to
14 basis points. The race-based redlining occurs despite our nding that a higher minority
share in a neighborhood actually reduces the probability of default (see Table 5). The high
correlation between the share of minorities and tract income likely makes it dicult for both
variables to be statistically relevant at the same time in most categories in all products
except 30-year ARMs where we have substantially more data. We see some evidence of race-
based redlining in 10-year ARMs and in 5-year ARMs; the model inclusion probabilities are
78 percent and 77 percent which are slightly below our threshold of 90 percent as shown in
Table 8.
Our results for the 2-year ARM category are consistent with the ndings of Haughwout,
Mayer, and Tracy (2009) for 2/28 mortgages. However, we nd evidence of income-based
redlining in this category; Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009) do not include Census tract
income in their specication although they do include controls for the home ownership and
unemployment rates. Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy nd evidence that a high share of blacks
or Hispanics in a neighborhood actually reduces the interest rate; we do not nd this in our
specication. Since our datasets dier, we cannot determine whether the dierence in our
ndings is due to dierences in the sample, the procedure used to detect discrimination, or
dierences in the product denition.
To understand how the basis points of adverse pricing we nd translate into increases in
payments, we consider a loan for $300,000 with full amortization over 30 years and a base
interest rate of 6:5%. Such a loan is representative of the 30 year ARM category, for example
(see Tables 12 to 14 of Appendix B). The upper bound for the eect of adverse pricing based
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basis points, the adverse pricing faced by blacks in 30-year ARMs. An increase in the interest
rate of 29 basis points translates into an increase in the monthly payment of $57:57 or 3%
of the payment. The upper bound on the increase in the interest rate due to race-based
redlining is 14 basis points, in the 3-year ARM category. An increase in the interest rate of
14 basis points raises the monthly payment by $27:71 or 1:5% of the payment.
The magnitude of the adverse pricing eects we nd for minorities is somewhat smaller
than the magnitudes Pope and Sydnor (2011a) and Ravina (2008) nd in the peer-to-peer
personal loan market. Pope and Sydnor (2011a) nd that blacks face interest rates that
are 60 to 80 basis points higher than whites while Ravina (2008) nds that black borrowers
pay 139 to 146 basis points more for their loans than whites. The smaller magnitude of the
eects in our study is likely due to more stringent regulation of the mortgage market than
the peer-to-peer personal loan market.
4.3 Robustness
We perform several robustness exercises. We rst add controls for metropolitan areas in
the rate equation. We also consider a three year horizon for default and prepayment rather
than the two year window in our benchmark. We also estimate the model with an indicator
variable for whether the loan was originated by a depository institution. The results in these
cases are similar to those from estimating our benchmark specication.
5 Understanding the Sources of Adverse Pricing
5.1 Disparate Impact vs. Disparate Treatment
The evaluation of adverse pricing outlined in Section 3 focused on distinguishing whether
disparities in loan rates across racial and neighborhood characteristics manifested in the loan
pricing equation. The procedure assumed that lenders took into account dierences in loan
performance across ethnic groups and then controlled for that eect to prevent statistical
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discrimination.
Identifying disparate impact discrimination requires determining whether disparities across
racial groups or neighborhood characteristics are the result of uniform underwriting stan-
dards across groups that, nevertheless, allow for embedded bias which negatively aects cer-
tain groups. In the context of our evaluation procedure, one way to approach this possibility
is to calculate measures of predicted performance that are based on actuarial estimations that
ignore the predictive content of individual race and neighborhood characteristics and allow
non-racial credit risk indicators to carry all the predictive content. In particular, consider
estimating the following model of loan performance:
PrrPim ￿ 1s ￿ pi0 ￿ iqqmq: (4)
Constructing the implied measure of forecasted performance with parameter estimates q 0
and q q yields
q Pin ￿ pq i0 ￿ q iqqnq: (5)
Disparate impact discrimination can then be assessed if any disparities in the x variables,
initially identied in the rate equation with the predicted performance dened in equations
(2) and (3), are reduced or eliminated once we use the measure of performance in equation
(5) that allows for bias in the probit coecients.
We studied this possibility and found no evidence of disparate impact. In other words,
allowing for bias in the estimated coecients of loan performance did not seem to eliminate
the disparities in the rate equation. In the interest of brevity, we do not report additional
tables. Results are available upon request.
5.2 Dierences in Search and Mortgage Market Channels
In this subsection, we explore whether the adverse pricing we nd is pervasive in the mortgage
market or whether it is specic to certain kinds of borrowers or certain types of originators.
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Our goal is to ascertain whether the adverse pricing we detect is pure discrimination on
the part of originators or whether some of the adverse pricing we detect may stem from
dierences in mortgage market access or borrower search. Table 9 summarizes our ndings
from estimating the model using particular subsamples of the data.
We rst explore whether the eect is equally strong in purchase and renance mortgages
to understand whether the borrower's experience in the mortgage market aects the likeli-
hood of adverse pricing. There may be dierences across race in the ability of borrowers to
eectively compare across mortgage oerings. Such dierences may arise because minority
borrowers are more likely to be the rst generation to be home owners and such do not
benet from intergenerational transfers of mortgage market knowledge. To the extent that
purchase mortgages have a higher share of rst time home buyers, who have less mortgage
market savvy than other borrowers, a nding of greater adverse pricing in the sample of
only purchase mortgages likely indicates that some of the adverse pricing we nd is not due
to discrimination on the part of lenders per se. Rather, such a nding would indicate that
the adverse pricing arises because minority borrowers that lack mortgage market experience
search less intensively or less eectively than white households.
When we estimate p1q using only data from purchase mortgages, we nd a greater degree
of adverse pricing for blacks and Hispanics as well as households in low income neighbor-
hoods or minority neighborhoods than in our benchmark specication. In our benchmark
specication, the upper bound on the eect of race on the rate was 29 basis points (in our
30-year ARM category). In the purchase only sample, the upper bound for the eect of race
on the upper bound for the eect of race on the rate is 54 points (in the 30-year ARM cat-
egory). The magnitudes of the adverse pricing in other products and for the neighborhood
characteristics are also higher in the purchase only sample than in the full sample.
In contrast, when we estimate p1q using only data from renancings, we nd adverse
pricing for blacks in only one product category (30 year ARMs) and higher prices for house-
holds residing in low income neighborhoods in only two products (30-year ARMs and 5-year
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ARMs). We nd no evidence of higher prices for Hispanics, or for households living in
neighborhoods with large minority shares in the renance only sample.
We next use data only from the top 10 originators in the product category to control for
originator-specic xed eects. The top 10 originators account for at least 40% of originations
in all products except 10-year FRMs where they account for only 10% of originations. When
we include xed eects for the originator, we see less evidence of adverse pricing than in
our benchmark specication. Although we continue to see adverse pricing against blacks
in the 30-year ARM category, we see evidence of adverse pricing for Hispanics in only the
10-year ARM category. By comparison, in our benchmark specication, we nd evidence of
adverse pricing for Hispanics in 30-year ARMs, 10-year ARMs, 5-year ARMs, and the Other
category.
We also see somewhat less evidence of income-based redlining or racial-based redlining
after controlling for originator xed eects. In our benchmark specication, we found evi-
dence of higher prices in low-income neighborhoods in all products except 3-year ARMs and
10-year ARMs as well as higher prices in neighborhoods with large shares of minorities in
3-year ARMs, 30-year ARMs, and 10-year ARMs. When we include originator xed eects,
we no longer see evidence of income-based redlining in 30-year FRMs or 10-year FRMs and
nd evidence of race-based redlining only in 3-year ARMs with 2-year ARM borrowers in
predominantly minority neighborhoods actually seeing lower rates.
To explore whether the dierence in our results once we include originator xed eects
are due in part to a smaller sample, we also estimate p1q with only the data from the top
10 originators but without originator xed eects. The results regarding the eect of race
on rates are quite similar to our benchmark specication. However, we see no evidence of
income-based redlining in the 10-year FRM category in this sample likely because the sample
size is quite small at only 710 originations.
Finally, we explore whether the adverse pricing is present for loans originated by a de-
pository institution, which we identify by the regulator reported to in HMDA, or is specic
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to loans originated by non-depository institutions. Non-depository institutions are likely to
be mortgage brokers. We estimate the rate equation rst on only depository institutions.
Depository institutions account for only 23% of 2-year ARM originations but between 40%
to 60% of originations in the other product categories.
When we restrict our attention to depository institutions, we nd much little evidence of
adverse pricing based on either race or neighborhood characteristics. In the 30-year ARM
categories, blacks face rates 18 basis points higher while Hispanics face rates 11 basis points
higher in the 5-year ARM category. We see evidence of income-based redlining only in the
5-year ARM category and no evidence of race-based redlining.
In the sample of loans originated by non-depository institutions, we see adverse pricing
more frequently and the magnitudes are larger for the adverse pricing due to race. For
example, in the 30-year ARM category, blacks face rates 44 basis points higher in the non-
depository institution sample while the adverse pricing faced by blacks in the 30-year ARM
category was only 29 basis points in the full sample.
5.3 Statistical Adverse Pricing
We next consider whether the adverse pricing we identify can be explained by higher default
or prepayment by minority households and households that live in certain kinds of neigh-
borhoods. We are not able to conclusively identify taste-based discrimination. However, we
are able to identify adverse pricing due to dierences in default or prepayment behavior.
To identify adverse pricing due to dierences in default or prepayment, the predicted loan
performance used in underwriting p3q is rewritten to include the vector of treatment variables,
wm. In this case, adverse pricing causes a change in the loan's predicted performance through
a dierence in the probability of, say, default. To capture this possibility, we can compute
an alternative measure of predicted performance that accounts for the eect of racial and
neighborhood characteristics:
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r Pin ￿ pp i0 ￿ p iqqn ￿ p iwwmq: (6)
The model identies statistical discrimination via a nonlinear, borrower-specic, eect
on loan performance based on racial and tract characteristics. Any residual adverse pricing
is then identied as a uniform direct eect of race on interest rates. That is, we identify the
form of discrimination by comparing price-setting models in which lenders use race to predict
loan performance (statistical discrimination) and models in which race aects interest rates
directly.
To accomplish this, we modify the rate equation to account for the change in expected
loan performance. We augment the rate equation with two vectors of model indicator dum-
mies,  and :
Rn ￿ 0 ￿ p
￿
p1 ￿ q d p Pn ￿  d r Pn
￿
￿ zzn ￿  d xxn ￿ en; (7)
where 1 is a vector of 1s with dimension p ￿ 1q. The model indicators  and  are vectors
of 0s and 1s with dimensions px ￿ 1q and p ￿ 1q, respectively. Individual elements of 
will determine the presence of disparate pricing in the rate: If k ￿ 1 then xk is turned on.
Because we restrict p to be the same in both the p Pn and r Pn terms, the s can be thought
of as a model selection variable that determines the presence of statistical adverse pricing;
that is, if i ￿ 1 then r Pi is turned on.
To estimate this specication, we modify our algorithm as follows. In the rst step, we
draw the slope parameters of the probit. Second, after allowing for convergence, for each
draw of , we compute two predicted performance measures, p Pn and r Pn, conditional on the
draw of . In the third step, for each p Pn and r Pn combination, we then iteratively draw 1,500
samples of , , and , burning the rst 1,000 to account for convergence. The remainder
of our algorithm is the same as for our benchmark specication.
Table 10 presents the estimation of the rate-setting equation augmented to account for
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dierences in loan performance across our variables of interest, equation (7). The estimated
coecients are separated in four panels corresponding to the constant; the measures of pre-
dicted performance, ^ P; the non-racial variables, z; and the race and neighborhood variables,
x. As in Table 7, the coecients represent the medians of the posterior distribution and the
shaded out coecients in the ^ P and z panels indicate that 0 is contained in the 90 percent
coverage interval. The bold italicized coecients in the ^ P panel additionally indicate that
the model inclusion probability (the probability that the value of  in equation (7) is equal
to 1) exceeds 90 percent, which indicates the presence of statistical adverse pricing.
The coecients associated with the treatment variables in the x panel also represent the
medians of the posterior distributions, conditional on the corresponding inclusion variable
, for cases in which the model inclusion probability (that the value of  in equation (7) is
equal to 1) exceeds 90 percent, which indicates the presence of adverse pricing that cannot
be explained by higher default or prepayment rates.
The estimates in table 7 show that we see statistical adverse-pricing in 30-year FRMs
and 5-year ARMs. As a result, the model inclusion probabilities for  in these products are
no longer above our threshold for many variables. We continue to see adverse pricing eects
that cannot be explained by higher default or prepayment probabilities in 2-year ARMs,
30-year ARMs, 5-year ARMs, and the Other category.
The results indicate that disparities in loan pricing for minorities cannot be explained
entirely by the eect of race or neighborhood characteristics on the probabilities of either
default or prepayment. In particular, the model that allows lenders to use information on race
and neighborhood characteristics to forecast default or prepayment probabilities (a practice
that is prohibited) indicates that, in addition to facing statistical discrimination, minorities
and individuals in lower-income neighborhoods seem to face adverse pricing practices in some
of the most popular mortgage products.
It is important to note that, according to Tables 5 and 6, both tract income and tract
minority share are important determinants of both default and prepayment for most product






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































365 UNDERSTANDING THE SOURCES OF ADVERSE PRICING
categories, while race is an important determinant of default for most products but an
important determinant of prepayment for only some products. These results suggest that
statistical discrimination on prepayment largely reects the predictive power of neighborhood
characteristics for this measure of loan performance.
Finally, it bears repeating that our procedure identies racial discrimination and redlining
that cannot be explained by higher default or prepayment probabilities. It is important to make
this distinction because fair lending law is quite clear that both statistical and taste-based
discrimination against minorities is illegal. Race-based redlining is also illegal. While income-
based redlining is not explicitly illegal, many federal housing policies (e.g., the aordable
housing goals of the GSEs and the Community Reinvestment Act) are aimed at reducing
the prevalence of this practice.
5.4 Discussion
We have found evidence of adverse pricing in every product we examined. In particular,
for 30-year ARMs (by far the most frequently used mortgage product, representing over 40
percent of all the mortgages we analyzed), we nd disparities in interest rates originating from
both race and neighborhood characteristics. The latter indicate the presence of disparate
treatment, as well as income-based and race-based redlining.
However, the eect of race and neighborhood characteristics diers substantially by the
type of loan (purchase or renancing) and by the type of originator. There is much less
evidence of adverse pricing in renancings than in purchase mortgages. Because borrowers
that renance by denition have more experience with the mortgage market than borrowers
taking out purchase mortgages, the dierence in the result for purchase and renance mort-
gages suggests that some of the adverse pricing minorities and households in traditionally
underserved areas face is due to dierences in their ability to nd the best possible rate rather
than discrimination on the part of originators per se. Traditionally underserved borrowers
may not have ready access to as many dierent lenders' programs and the inexperienced
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may not be actively seeking out the best rate.
Our nding that adverse pricing is more prevalent among non-depository institutions also
suggests mortgage market channels play an important role in explaining the adverse pricing
traditionally underserved borrowers face. Mortgage brokers may be marketing expensive
mortgages aggressively in minority neighborhoods. Conditional on receiving a mortgage
from a depository institution, however, traditionally underserved households do not seem to
be suering adverse pricing. We cannot, however, eliminate the possibility that the dierence
in our results for depository institutions is a result of greater regulatory scrutiny of depository
institutions than of mortgage brokers.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we examined the eect of race and ethnicity on the pricing of subprime mort-
gages in California and Florida during 2005. We estimated a reduced-form model of mortgage
rate determination in which the lender takes into account the predicted loan performance
when making the rate-setting decision. We assessed the eect of race and ethnicity, as well
as the eect of neighborhood characteristics, both in the loan performance evaluation and
in the lender's rate decision.
The estimation procedure disentangles various forms of discrimination contemplated in
U.S. mortgage laws. Furthermore, we assess the presence of statistical discrimination in
lenders' predictions of loan performance. In contrast to previous studies of the subprime
market, we nd evidence of adverse pricing against black or Hispanic borrowers in four of
the mortgage products we consider. These eects lead to rate increases ranging from 5 to
29 basis points. For a typical loan in our sample, an increase in the interest rate of 29 basis
points translates into an increase in the monthly payment of $57:57.
To the extent that black and Hispanic borrowers live in low-income neighborhoods and
in neighborhoods with high proportions of minority borrowers, they may face an additional
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increase in their rates due to redlining; we nd adverse pricing eects in lower-income neigh-
borhoods or in neighborhoods with a high proportion of racial minorities in all but one
category. The increase in the rate from an increase in the minority population share from
0% to 100% ranges from 9 to 14 basis points. We also nd that, for minority borrowers,
the purchase of PMI seems to be associated with obtaining lower interest rates. We nd
evidence of statistically-based adverse pricing or redlining related to loan performance in
two products.
A limitation of our study is that we cannot infer whether discrimination exists in the
prime market. To the extent that the subprime market relies more heavily on manual un-
derwriting than the prime market, it is possible that automated underwriting has eliminated
discrimination and redlining in the prime market. However, we cannot conrm or dispel this
notion without a direct examination of the prime market.
Some of the adverse pricing that we are identifying is likely due to factors other than
an explicit intent on the part of lenders to discriminate against racial minorities or to red-
line. Other factors that might give rise to the adverse pricing we nd include a lack of
competition in the mortgage market in certain neighborhoods, mortgage market segmenta-
tion14, or reduced search eorts or a lower ability of certain borrowers to compare across
sets of loan terms.15 Indeed, we nd the strongest evidence of adverse pricing in purchase
mortgages where borrowers have presumably less experience in the mortgage market. Our
results nevertheless show that despite decades of policies to eliminate racial discrimination
and redlining, minorities and borrowers in historically credit-disadvantaged neighborhoods
are still paying more for their loans.
14See Nichols, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2005) for a discussion of segmentation of the subprime and
prime mortgage markets.
15Indeed, Woodward and Hall (2010) nd evidence that minorities pay more in closing costs, a nding
they attribute to consumer confusion.
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Appendix
A: Estimation Details
This appendix describes the Bayesian methods used to estimate the model in sections 3 and
5.3. The model is estimated with an iterative technique { the Gibbs sampler { which requires
a prior. For the slope parameters in the rate equation p7q, we assume a normal prior. The
innovation variance of the rate equation has an inverse gamma prior. Each of the model
indicators has a at prior. The hyper-parameters for the prior distributions are shown in
Table 11.
Table 11: Priors for Estimation
Parameter Prior Distribution Hyperparameters
i N pa0;A0q a0 ￿ 01￿q￿w ; A0￿ I1￿q￿w
￿p N pb0;B0q b0 ￿ 01￿x￿z ; B0 ￿ I1￿x￿z








0 ￿ 6 ; 0 ￿ 0:01
Estimation of the parameters of p2q can be accomplished by data augmentation (Tanner
and Wong, 1987). Dene a latent variable, yim, which has mean i0 ￿ iqqm ￿ iwwm,
unit variance, and is restricted such that yim ¡ 0 i Pim ￿ 1. Then, conditional on i,
yi ￿ tyimu
M
m￿1 can be drawn independently from truncated normal distributions. Let q ￿
pq1;:::;qMq
1 and w ￿ pw1;:::;wMq
1. Then, conditional on the drawn yim, we draw i from a
normal posterior as follows:
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0 a0 ￿ X1
iyi
￿
, yi ￿ pyi1;:::;yiMq
1, and Xi ￿
p1M;q;wq. After a suitable number of draws are discarded to obtain convergence, we use
the draws of the i to generate predictions for performance of the N loans to be used for
underwriting. For each draw, we compute p Pn and r Pn from p3q and p6q, respectively.16
For each (post-convergence) draw of p Pn, we sample 1;000 draws from the posterior
distributions of the model parameters ￿p, p, , , and 2. Conditional on  and 2, the
model inclusion parameters, , and the vector of slopes (excluding p), ￿p, can be drawn
jointly from a reversible-jump Metropolis-Hastings-in-Gibbs step (see Troughton and Godsill,












which means we draw the candidate ￿ rst and then, conditional on ￿, we draw ￿
￿p. The
candidate ￿ is generated by drawing a random index from a discrete uniform distribution.
The element corresponding to the drawn index is switched { 1 to 0, 0 to 1. Then, conditional
on ￿, the prior for ￿p is

￿








0 are the hyperparameters corresponding to the candidate covariate set. The
candidate ￿ is drawn from




16The benchmark model sets  ￿ 0 such that we do not make use of ~ Pn.
17Turning elements of the indicator  on and o changes the model dimension. The resulting variation in
































p PN ￿ p1 ￿ q r PN
￿￿1


































where the unstarred b, B, and B0 correspond to the hyperparameters computed conditional
on the last (accepted) iteration of .
Next, we draw the joint pair p;pq by again selecting a candidate ￿ and drawing ￿
p
from a normal proposal, conditional on . The proposals for  and p { as well as the
acceptance probability { have forms similar to those expressed above. For brevity, we omit
the formalities.
The nal step in the Gibbs loop is the draw of 2 conditional on ￿p, p, , , and












where e ￿ R￿ and  ￿
￿
1N;p PN ￿ p1 ￿ q r PN;z1
N;x1
N
￿1
.
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B: Summary Statistics
466 CONCLUSIONS
T
a
b
l
e
1
2
:
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
b
y
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
:
C
l
o
s
i
n
g
r
a
t
e
a
n
d
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
2
-
y
r
A
R
M
3
-
y
r
A
R
M
3
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
3
0
-
y
r
A
R
M
1
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
1
0
-
y
r
A
R
M
5
-
y
r
A
R
M
O
t
h
e
r
T
o
t
a
l
C
l
o
s
i
n
g
r
a
t
e
6
.
7
3
8
6
.
3
7
4
6
.
7
1
2
6
.
4
4
8
6
.
2
2
6
6
.
0
1
1
6
.
5
6
6
6
.
6
2
2
6
.
5
0
5
(
%
)
(
0
.
7
5
3
)
(
0
.
8
8
0
)
(
0
.
9
2
7
)
(
2
.
1
0
9
)
(
0
.
4
9
2
)
(
0
.
6
8
5
)
(
0
.
7
9
5
)
(
1
.
5
5
4
)
(
1
.
5
7
9
)
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
0
.
1
4
9
0
.
1
0
1
0
.
0
5
3
6
0
.
1
2
3
0
.
0
4
0
1
0
.
0
6
3
4
0
.
1
4
6
0
.
1
5
4
0
.
1
1
7
(
s
h
a
r
e
)
(
0
.
3
5
6
)
(
0
.
3
0
1
)
(
0
.
2
2
5
)
(
0
.
3
2
8
)
(
0
.
1
9
6
)
(
0
.
2
4
4
)
(
0
.
3
5
3
)
(
0
.
3
6
1
)
(
0
.
3
2
2
)
P
r
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
0
.
3
9
2
0
.
3
9
4
0
.
2
8
3
0
.
4
7
3
0
.
2
0
0
0
.
3
1
0
0
.
3
2
4
0
.
3
2
4
0
.
3
8
4
(
s
h
a
r
e
)
(
0
.
4
8
8
)
(
0
.
4
8
9
)
(
0
.
4
5
0
)
(
0
.
4
9
9
)
(
0
.
4
0
0
)
(
0
.
4
6
3
)
(
0
.
4
6
8
)
(
0
.
4
6
8
)
(
0
.
4
8
6
)
E
n
t
r
i
e
s
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
o
f
e
a
c
h
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
a
c
r
o
s
s
t
h
e
e
n
t
i
r
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
w
i
t
h
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
a
n
d
p
r
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
a
r
e
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
1
i
f
t
h
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
e
v
e
n
t
o
c
c
u
r
s
w
i
t
h
i
n
2
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
l
o
a
n
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
.
A
l
l
l
o
a
n
s
h
a
v
e
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
3
0
y
e
a
r
s
.
A
2
-
y
r
A
R
M
i
s
a
n
A
R
M
t
h
a
t
i
s
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
o
n
l
y
f
o
r
t
h
e

r
s
t
t
w
o
y
e
a
r
s
a
n
d
f
u
l
l
y
a
m
o
r
t
i
z
i
n
g
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
2
8
y
e
a
r
s
.
T
h
r
e
e
-
y
e
a
r
A
R
M
s
,
5
-
y
r
A
R
M
s
,
a
n
d
1
0
-
y
r
A
R
M
s
a
r
e
d
e

n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
w
a
y
b
u
t
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
-
o
n
l
y
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
o
f
t
h
r
e
e
,

v
e
,
o
r
t
e
n
y
e
a
r
s
.
T
h
i
r
t
y
-
y
e
a
r
A
R
M
s
a
r
e
f
u
l
l
y
a
m
o
r
t
i
z
i
n
g
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
t
h
i
r
t
y
y
e
a
r
s
a
s
a
r
e
3
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
s
.
F
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
t
h
e
1
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
i
s
a
n
F
R
M
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
-
o
n
l
y
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
t
h
e

r
s
t
t
e
n
y
e
a
r
s
a
n
d
f
u
l
l
a
m
o
r
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
2
0
y
e
a
r
s
.
476 CONCLUSIONS
T
a
b
l
e
1
3
:
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
b
y
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
:
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
a
n
d
l
o
a
n
s
p
e
c
i

c
r
i
s
k
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
2
-
y
r
A
R
M
3
-
y
r
A
R
M
3
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
3
0
-
y
r
A
R
M
1
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
1
0
-
y
r
A
R
M
5
-
y
r
A
R
M
O
t
h
e
r
T
o
t
a
l
L
T
V
8
1
.
1
8
7
9
.
4
3
7
0
.
1
9
7
6
.
3
8
7
0
.
5
0
7
6
.
2
7
7
9
.
8
8
7
4
.
9
2
7
6
.
2
7
(
%
)
(
7
.
9
7
2
)
(
9
.
5
5
1
)
(
1
6
.
1
4
)
(
1
2
.
4
5
)
(
1
4
.
4
1
)
(
1
0
.
2
4
)
(
8
.
6
7
2
)
(
1
3
.
4
4
)
(
1
2
.
5
6
)
P
P
P
0
.
9
3
7
0
.
6
6
3
0
.
7
5
7
0
.
8
9
0
0
.
2
7
8
0
.
3
8
1
0
.
8
4
9
0
.
8
6
5
0
.
8
1
8
(
s
h
a
r
e
)
(
0
.
2
4
3
)
(
0
.
4
7
3
)
(
0
.
4
2
9
)
(
0
.
3
1
3
)
(
0
.
4
4
8
)
(
0
.
4
8
6
)
(
0
.
3
5
8
)
(
0
.
3
4
2
)
(
0
.
3
8
6
)
D
T
I
3
2
.
3
5
1
7
.
4
9
2
1
.
5
5
2
5
.
8
0
1
3
.
6
9
2
5
.
3
6
3
2
.
7
4
2
9
.
0
8
2
6
.
8
1
(
%
)
(
1
8
.
5
1
)
(
2
0
.
3
2
)
(
2
0
.
9
0
)
(
2
0
.
2
6
)
(
1
8
.
7
3
)
(
1
8
.
2
2
)
(
1
8
.
6
3
)
(
1
9
.
3
9
)
(
2
0
.
1
7
)
F
I
C
O
6
5
4
.
6
6
6
6
.
2
6
5
2
.
5
6
3
5
.
7
7
1
7
.
6
7
1
6
.
2
6
6
5
.
6
6
5
5
.
9
6
5
3
.
7
(
4
7
.
5
6
)
(
5
9
.
4
6
)
(
6
9
.
1
2
)
(
7
4
.
2
8
)
(
4
8
.
9
4
)
(
4
4
.
9
0
)
(
5
1
.
7
9
)
(
6
7
.
1
4
)
(
6
9
.
2
4
)
P
M
I
0
.
1
0
7
0
.
0
7
5
4
0
.
1
8
7
0
.
1
8
4
0
.
0
3
6
2
0
.
0
5
2
6
0
.
1
5
7
0
.
1
0
8
0
.
1
5
4
(
%
)
(
0
.
3
0
9
)
(
0
.
2
6
4
)
(
0
.
3
9
0
)
(
0
.
3
8
8
)
(
0
.
1
8
7
)
(
0
.
2
2
3
)
(
0
.
3
6
4
)
(
0
.
3
1
1
)
(
0
.
3
6
1
)
A
m
o
u
n
t
3
2
7
,
3
2
6
3
3
2
,
7
0
6
2
5
0
,
8
3
6
3
1
3
,
0
8
3
3
7
5
,
8
8
6
4
1
5
,
1
9
4
3
4
0
,
5
0
9
3
4
3
,
7
0
0
3
2
2
,
2
7
4
(
$
)
(
1
3
1
,
0
1
6
)
(
1
6
2
,
9
4
9
)
(
1
6
8
,
0
1
3
)
(
2
2
0
,
8
6
2
)
(
2
3
1
,
9
8
3
)
(
2
4
7
,
1
4
5
)
(
1
6
2
,
2
4
3
)
(
2
0
0
,
3
1
6
)
(
2
0
3
,
0
5
1
)
F
u
l
l
D
o
c
0
.
4
4
9
0
.
4
9
9
0
.
5
9
3
0
.
4
0
1
0
.
3
7
0
0
.
2
3
6
0
.
4
8
6
0
.
3
6
5
0
.
4
3
1
(
s
h
a
r
e
)
(
0
.
4
9
7
)
(
0
.
5
0
0
)
(
0
.
4
9
1
)
(
0
.
4
9
0
)
(
0
.
4
8
3
)
(
0
.
4
2
5
)
(
0
.
5
0
0
)
(
0
.
4
8
1
)
(
0
.
4
9
5
)
R
e

0
.
3
6
6
0
.
4
2
9
0
.
8
1
0
0
.
6
4
4
0
.
5
3
8
0
.
3
2
8
0
.
3
8
1
0
.
5
9
4
0
.
5
7
1
(
s
h
a
r
e
)
(
0
.
4
8
2
)
(
0
.
4
9
5
)
(
0
.
3
9
2
)
(
0
.
4
7
9
)
(
0
.
4
9
9
)
(
0
.
4
6
9
)
(
0
.
4
8
6
)
(
0
.
4
9
1
)
(
0
.
4
9
5
)
F
L
0
.
1
6
3
0
.
2
4
0
0
.
4
4
0
0
.
3
9
6
0
.
2
6
2
0
.
2
5
2
0
.
2
0
5
0
.
2
1
4
0
.
3
2
0
(
s
h
a
r
e
)
(
0
.
3
7
0
)
(
0
.
4
2
7
)
(
0
.
4
9
6
)
(
0
.
4
8
9
)
(
0
.
4
4
0
)
(
0
.
4
3
4
)
(
0
.
4
0
4
)
(
0
.
4
1
0
)
(
0
.
4
6
6
)
E
n
t
r
i
e
s
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
o
f
e
a
c
h
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
a
c
r
o
s
s
t
h
e
e
n
t
i
r
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
w
i
t
h
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
L
T
V
i
s
l
o
a
n
-
t
o
-
v
a
l
u
e
r
a
t
i
o
,
D
T
I
i
s
d
e
b
t
-
t
o
-
i
n
c
o
m
e
-
r
a
t
i
o
,
P
P
P
i
s
a
d
u
m
m
y
f
o
r
p
r
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
p
e
n
a
l
t
i
e
s
,
P
M
I
i
s
a
d
u
m
m
y
f
o
r
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
r
t
g
a
g
e
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
,
F
u
l
l
D
o
c
i
s
a
d
u
m
m
y
f
o
r
f
u
l
l
i
n
c
o
m
e
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
R
e

i
s
a
d
u
m
m
y
f
o
r
r
e

n
a
n
c
e
s
,
F
L
i
s
a
d
u
m
m
y
f
o
r
F
l
o
r
i
d
a
.
A
l
l
l
o
a
n
s
h
a
v
e
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
3
0
y
e
a
r
s
.
A
2
-
y
r
A
R
M
i
s
a
n
A
R
M
t
h
a
t
i
s
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
o
n
l
y
f
o
r
t
h
e

r
s
t
t
w
o
y
e
a
r
s
a
n
d
f
u
l
l
y
a
m
o
r
t
i
z
i
n
g
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
2
8
y
e
a
r
s
.
T
h
r
e
e
-
y
e
a
r
A
R
M
s
,
5
-
y
r
A
R
M
s
,
a
n
d
1
0
-
y
r
A
R
M
s
a
r
e
d
e

n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
w
a
y
b
u
t
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
-
o
n
l
y
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
o
f
t
h
r
e
e
,

v
e
,
o
r
t
e
n
y
e
a
r
s
.
T
h
i
r
t
y
-
y
e
a
r
A
R
M
s
a
r
e
f
u
l
l
y
a
m
o
r
t
i
z
i
n
g
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
t
h
i
r
t
y
y
e
a
r
s
a
s
a
r
e
3
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
s
.
F
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
t
h
e
1
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
i
s
a
n
F
R
M
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
-
o
n
l
y
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
t
h
e

r
s
t
t
e
n
y
e
a
r
s
a
n
d
f
u
l
l
a
m
o
r
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
2
0
y
e
a
r
s
.
486 CONCLUSIONS
T
a
b
l
e
1
4
:
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
b
y
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
:
R
a
c
e
a
n
d
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
h
o
o
d
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
2
-
y
r
A
R
M
3
-
y
r
A
R
M
3
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
3
0
-
y
r
A
R
M
1
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
1
0
-
y
r
A
R
M
5
-
y
r
A
R
M
O
t
h
e
r
T
o
t
a
l
B
l
a
c
k
0
.
0
7
6
4
0
.
0
7
3
5
0
.
0
9
1
4
0
.
0
9
5
0
0
.
0
3
9
5
0
.
0
4
1
6
0
.
0
7
2
5
0
.
0
8
0
1
0
.
0
8
3
0
(
0
.
2
6
6
)
(
0
.
2
6
1
)
(
0
.
2
8
8
)
(
0
.
2
9
3
)
(
0
.
1
9
5
)
(
0
.
2
0
0
)
(
0
.
2
5
9
)
(
0
.
2
7
1
)
(
0
.
2
7
6
)
H
i
s
p
a
n
i
c
0
.
4
1
8
0
.
3
0
8
0
.
2
5
2
0
.
2
8
7
0
.
1
9
0
0
.
2
3
7
0
.
3
5
0
0
.
3
4
1
0
.
3
0
2
(
0
.
4
9
3
)
(
0
.
4
6
2
)
(
0
.
4
3
4
)
(
0
.
4
5
3
)
(
0
.
3
9
2
)
(
0
.
4
2
5
)
(
0
.
4
7
7
)
(
0
.
4
7
4
)
(
0
.
4
5
9
)
P
P
P
￿
B
l
a
c
k
0
.
0
7
1
9
0
.
0
5
7
2
0
.
0
8
0
6
0
.
0
8
9
0
0
.
0
1
0
3
0
.
0
1
8
0
0
.
0
6
4
8
0
.
0
7
3
4
0
.
0
7
4
3
(
0
.
2
5
8
)
(
0
.
2
3
2
)
(
0
.
2
7
2
)
(
0
.
2
8
5
)
(
0
.
1
0
1
)
(
0
.
1
3
3
)
(
0
.
2
4
6
)
(
0
.
2
6
1
)
(
0
.
2
6
2
)
P
P
P
￿
H
i
s
p
a
n
i
c
0
.
3
9
9
0
.
2
2
9
0
.
2
0
4
0
.
2
6
5
0
.
0
6
2
4
0
.
1
1
2
0
.
3
1
5
0
.
3
1
1
0
.
2
6
4
(
0
.
4
9
0
)
(
0
.
4
2
0
)
(
0
.
4
0
3
)
(
0
.
4
4
1
)
(
0
.
2
4
2
)
(
0
.
3
1
6
)
(
0
.
4
6
4
)
(
0
.
4
6
3
)
(
0
.
4
4
1
)
P
M
I
￿
B
l
a
c
k
0
.
0
0
8
1
2
0
.
0
0
5
9
2
0
.
0
2
0
2
0
.
0
2
0
6
0
.
0
0
1
6
4
0
.
0
0
2
8
4
0
.
0
1
1
4
0
.
0
0
9
7
5
0
.
0
1
5
3
(
0
.
0
8
9
7
)
(
0
.
0
7
6
7
)
(
0
.
1
4
1
)
(
0
.
1
4
2
)
(
0
.
0
4
0
4
)
(
0
.
0
5
3
2
)
(
0
.
1
0
6
)
(
0
.
0
9
8
3
)
(
0
.
1
2
3
)
P
M
I
￿
H
i
s
p
a
n
i
c
0
.
0
4
3
7
0
.
0
2
9
2
0
.
0
4
7
6
0
.
0
5
4
1
0
.
0
0
9
9
7
0
.
0
1
1
3
0
.
0
5
9
6
0
.
0
3
4
6
0
.
0
4
7
7
(
0
.
2
0
4
)
(
0
.
1
6
8
)
(
0
.
2
1
3
)
(
0
.
2
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
9
9
4
)
(
0
.
1
0
6
)
(
0
.
2
3
7
)
(
0
.
1
8
3
)
(
0
.
2
1
3
)
T
r
a
c
t
i
n
c
o
m
e
0
.
8
8
7
0
.
9
4
8
0
.
9
2
3
0
.
9
3
8
1
.
0
3
7
1
.
0
3
6
0
.
9
2
3
0
.
9
2
0
0
.
9
3
7
(
0
.
3
1
1
)
(
0
.
3
3
8
)
(
0
.
3
3
2
)
(
0
.
3
5
4
)
(
0
.
3
8
7
)
(
0
.
4
0
8
)
(
0
.
3
2
8
)
(
0
.
3
4
4
)
(
0
.
3
4
9
)
T
r
a
c
t
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
0
.
5
4
1
0
.
4
7
5
0
.
4
4
5
0
.
4
5
8
0
.
3
7
1
0
.
4
0
7
0
.
4
9
2
0
.
4
9
4
0
.
4
6
6
(
0
.
2
6
6
)
(
0
.
2
6
9
)
(
0
.
2
9
1
)
(
0
.
2
8
3
)
(
0
.
2
5
0
)
(
0
.
2
5
6
)
(
0
.
2
6
8
)
(
0
.
2
7
6
)
(
0
.
2
7
9
)
E
n
t
r
i
e
s
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
o
f
e
a
c
h
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
a
c
r
o
s
s
t
h
e
e
n
t
i
r
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
w
i
t
h
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
P
P
P
￿
r
a
c
e
i
s
t
h
e
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
p
e
n
a
l
t
y
a
n
d
r
a
c
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
.
S
i
m
i
l
a
r
l
y
,
P
M
I
￿
r
a
c
e
i
s
t
h
e
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
m
o
r
t
g
a
g
e
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
n
d
r
a
c
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
.
T
r
a
c
t
i
n
c
o
m
e
i
s
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
t
h
e
C
e
n
s
u
s
t
r
a
c
t
m
e
d
i
a
n
f
a
m
i
l
y
i
n
c
o
m
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
U
.
S
.
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
o
f
H
o
u
s
i
n
g
a
n
d
U
r
b
a
n
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
(
H
U
D
)
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
o
f
t
h
e
m
e
t
r
o
p
o
l
i
t
a
n
a
r
e
a
'
s
f
a
m
i
l
y
i
n
c
o
m
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
H
M
D
A
d
a
t
a
.
T
r
a
c
t
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
i
s
t
h
e
C
e
n
s
u
s
t
r
a
c
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
2
0
0
0
C
e
n
s
u
s
.
A
l
l
l
o
a
n
s
h
a
v
e
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
3
0
y
e
a
r
s
.
A
2
-
y
r
A
R
M
i
s
a
n
A
R
M
t
h
a
t
i
s
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
o
n
l
y
f
o
r
t
h
e

r
s
t
t
w
o
y
e
a
r
s
a
n
d
f
u
l
l
y
a
m
o
r
t
i
z
i
n
g
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
2
8
y
e
a
r
s
.
T
h
r
e
e
-
y
e
a
r
A
R
M
s
,
5
-
y
r
A
R
M
s
,
a
n
d
1
0
-
y
r
A
R
M
s
a
r
e
d
e

n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
w
a
y
b
u
t
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
-
o
n
l
y
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
o
f
t
h
r
e
e
,

v
e
,
o
r
t
e
n
y
e
a
r
s
.
T
h
i
r
t
y
-
y
e
a
r
A
R
M
s
a
r
e
f
u
l
l
y
a
m
o
r
t
i
z
i
n
g
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
t
h
i
r
t
y
y
e
a
r
s
a
s
a
r
e
3
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
s
.
F
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
t
h
e
1
0
-
y
r
F
R
M
i
s
a
n
F
R
M
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
-
o
n
l
y
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
t
h
e

r
s
t
t
e
n
y
e
a
r
s
a
n
d
f
u
l
l
a
m
o
r
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
2
0
y
e
a
r
s
.
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